Abstract: Lee et al. have proposed an untraceable (t, n) threshold signature scheme which can be extended to give the original signers the ability to prove they are the true signers. The present authors add the requirement of (k, l) threshold-shared verification to the scheme of Lee et al. In the proposed scheme, any t participants can represent a group to sign messages with/without anonymity, and k verifiers can represent another group to authenticate the signature.
Introduction
Since digital signature techniques can achieve some tasks such as identifying senders, authenticating message contents, preventing denial of message ownership and protecting ownership, they are playing a more and more important role in our modern electronic society. Traditional digital signatures such as RSA [1] [2] [3] [4] and DSA [5, 6] only allow a single signer to sign a message, and anyone can verify the signature at anytime. For distributing the power of a single signing, the threshold signatures are motivated by the need that arises in organisations to have a group of employees who agree on a message before signing.
In the threshold signature schemes, it is necessary to predetermine the threshold value t so that at least t participants in the group can collaborate to generate a valid signature on behalf of the group, but tÀ1 or fewer participants will not be enough. Anyone who plays the role of a verifier can use the group's public key to authenticate the signature.
In 1991, Desmedt and Frankel [7] proposed a (t, n) threshold signature scheme based on the RSA cryptosystem [4] . Later, Li et al. [8] pointed out that t or more malicious participants can forge the signature without taking any responsibility. In 1994, Harn [9] proposed an alternative (t, n) threshold signature scheme based on Shamir's perfect secret scheme [10] and the modified ElGamal signature [11] . Based on the property of Lagrange polynomials, the group's secret key is distributed into n different shadows to each participant. Any t or more participants can use their shadows to generate individual signatures and combine t individual signatures to obtain a threshold signature. On the other hand, to trace back to find the original signers in case of a forged document, several (t, n) threshold schemes of traceability [12] [13] [14] and their comments [15] [16] [17] have been proposed.
In 2000, Wang et al. [18] proposed a new (t, n) threshold signature scheme with (k, l) threshold-shared verification. According to the security level of a document, not only can the document be signed by some specified signers in the group (signing group), but also it can be verified by some specified verifiers in another group (verifying group). For example, there are two companies connected in business with each other. The power of signing is distributed for several managers to represent a company to sign a contract with the other company via a computer network. The signature of the contract is generated as a threshold signature. For the same reason, the power of verifying is also distributed for several managers to represent the other company to verify the signature of contract.
Unfortunately, Tseng et al. [19] and Hsu et al. [20] have separately shown that Wang et al.'s scheme is insecure; any adversary can compute group secret keys from two valid threshold signatures. They also separately proposed their own improved schemes to withstand the attack. Recently, Lee [21] pointed out that the signing group secret key of the improved scheme of Tseng et al. is also apt to be disclosed. Fundamentally, the improved scheme [19] has the weaknesses: t or more malicious participants can actually use the Lagrange polynomial formula to derive other participants' secret keys and system secrets. Furthermore, a shared distribution centre must take part in the generation of each threshold signature to distribute fresh shadows to all participants, which does not seem to fit in practical applications.
In 2000, Lee et al. [22] proposed an untraceable (t, n) threshold signature scheme based on the Ohta-Okamoto signature scheme [23] . For the sake of privacy and safety, the identities of the signers should be anonymous in a democratic society. At the same time, their scheme can be extended to give the original signers the ability to prove they are true signers, and any t or more malicious participants cannot reconstruct the polynomial to derive other participants' secret keys and system secrets. Furthermore, Lee et al. [22] pointed out that the scheme in [9] can be seen as an untraceable (t, n) threshold signature scheme if the scheme does not provide an individual signature verification mechanism.
In this paper, we will attempt to combine Lee et al.'s (t, n) untraceable scheme and the requirement of (k, l) thresholdshared verification. Moreover, our scheme can be easily modified to provide the verification mechanism for individual signatures. In this Section, we shall first review Lee et al.'s untraceable (t, n) threshold signature scheme. There is a shared distribution centre (SDC) which is responsible for initialising the system and generating the parameters in the system. The notation G s (7G s 7 ¼ n) is defined as the signing group of n signers and g s (7g s 7 ¼ trn) as any subset of t signers in G s . The scheme is divided into three phases as follows: the parametes generating phase; the individual signature generating phase; and the threshold signature generating and verifying phase.
Parameter generating phase
In this phase, the SDC is responsible for initialising the system and generating parameters as follows:
Step 1. Randomly choose two large secret primes p and q, and compute a public number N ¼ p Á q. To ensure that p and q are strong primes, let p ¼ 2p 0 +1 and q ¼ 2q 0 +1, where p 0 and q 0 are also secret primes.
Step 2. Let l(N) ¼ 2p 0 q 0 (where l(N) is the Carmichael function) be secret and randomly choose a public number WE10
50
, where gcd(l(N),W) ¼ 1.
Step 3. Randomly choose a secret primitive a in both GF(p) and GF(q).
Step 4. Randomly choose a secret polynomial f s (x) mod l(N) of degree tÀ1, where
Step 6. Randomly select n public and odd integers x si with even f s (x si ) [7] for each participant P si in G s (iAG s ), and their secret keys K si are as follows:
where
Step 7. Select a public collision-free one-way hash function H( Á ).
Individual signature generating phase
In this phase, P si generates her/his individual signature. Without loss of generality, assume that t participants P s1 , P s2 ,y, P st in g s are to sign a message m. Each P si randomly chooses an integer r si with 0or si oN, and computes u si as follows:
Then, P si broadcasts u si to the other tÀ1 participants in g s . Once each P si receives u j (j ¼ 1,2,y, t and jai), she/he computes U s and a hash value e as follows:
e ¼ H ðU s ; mÞ ð 4Þ
Then, each P si uses her/his secret key K si to generate her/his individual signature as follows:
Each P si sends (z si , m) to a designated clerk who is responsible for the computation of the threshold signature. There is no secret value kept by the clerk, so the clerk can be a general computer.
Threshold signature generating and verifying phase
After receiving t individual signatures, the clerk computes the threshold signature as follows:
To verify the threshold signature {e, Z s } for the message m, the verifier first computes a valueŨ s U s as follows:
Then, the verifier checks the following equation:
If (8) holds, the threshold signature {e, Z s } is valid.
Proposed scheme
In this Section, we shall add the requirement of (k, l)
is defined as the verifying group of l verifiers and g v (7g v 7 ¼ krl) as any subset of k verifiers in G v . Here, we first present the properties of an untraceable (t, n) threshold signature scheme with (k, l) threshold-shared verification.
Only t out of n in G s can generate the signature on behalf of the group.
Only k out of l in G v can verify the threshold signature on behalf of the group.
The signer of the threshold signature cannot be traced.
Our scheme also consists of three phases as follows: the parameter generating phase; the individual signature generating phase; and the threshold signature generating and verifying phase.
Parameter generating phase
The system notations (SDC, G s , g s ) and parameters (p, q, p 0 ,
are the same as those in Lee et al.'s. scheme. The SDC performs the following steps to initialise the system and generate parameters as follows:
Step 1. Randomly choose two numbers a and b such that the greatest common divisor of a and b is 1. When gcd(a,b) ¼ 1, there must be exactly two integers c and h that satisfy the equation a Á c+b Á h ¼ 1. The extended Euclidean algorithm [24] can find such integers.
Step 2. Randomly choose two secret polynomials
Step 3. Randomly select l public and odd integers x vi with even f v (x vi ) for each participant P vi in G v (iAG v ), and their secret keys K vi are as follows:
Individual signature generating phase
The message m and the values (u si , U s , e, z si ) are separately computed in (2), (3), (4) and (5), respectively, which are the same as the equations in Lee et al.'s. scheme. In order to trace back to find the original signers of a forged document, our scheme can provide an individual signature verification mechanism. In other words, the individual signatures should be verified by a clerk who is responsible for the verification and computation of the threshold signature. Because the clerk has to verify the individual signatures by using the individual signers' public keys before generating the group signature, the clerk knows who has signed the document and can securely record it in a database. In the parameter generating phase, the SDC distributes a public key y si for each P si in G s as follows:
In the individual signature-generating phase, each P si produces the values (u si , U s , e, z si ) separately by (2), (3), (4) and (5), respectively, and added to them is a hash value e i as follows:
After receiving (e, e i , z si , m), the clerk uses P si 's public key y si to compute a valueũ si u si as follows:
and checks the following equation: 
Threshold signature generating and verifying phase
The generation of the threshold signature Z s in (6) in Lee et al.'s scheme is also present here. Then, the threshold signature {e, Z s } of the message m is transmitted to G v . To verify the group signature, any k out of the l verifiers in G v should cooperate to authenticate the validity of the signature. Without loss of generality, assume that there are k participants P v1 , P v2 ,y, P vk in g v . Each P vi randomly chooses an integer r vi with 0or vi oN and computes u vi and z vi as follows:
Then, each P vi transmits u vi and z vi to a clerk who can be randomly chosen from G v to compute U v and Z v as follows:
Afterwards, the threshold signature can be verified by using G s 's public key Y to compute a valueŨ s U s as follows:
To authenticate the validity of the threshold signature is to check (8) . If (8) holds, the threshold signature {e, Z s } on the message m is valid. Theorem 1. The proposed scheme is a (t, n) threshold signature scheme with (k, l) threshold-shared verification.
Proof. According to (2) , (3) and (4), we can rewrite the hash value e as follows: (5) and (6), the values z si and Z s can be derived as follows: 
Therefore, the correctness of (8) can be verified. In this case, {e, Z s } must be a signature generated by t signers in G s , and only k verifiers in G v can verify it.
Q.E.D. Theorem 2. The proposed (t, n) threshold signature scheme with (k, l) threshold-shared verification is untraceable. Proof. Assume that there are two subsets g s and g Since the threshold signature Z s can be expressed as:
is also true. Q.E.D. Like Lee et al.'s scheme, our scheme can also be further extended (See [21] for a more detailed description) to give the original signers the ability to prove that they are the true signers. In the individual signature generating phase, each P si randomly chooses an integer r si and computes a value u si ¼ r si L mod N , additionally. Each P si broadcasts u si to the other tÀ1 participants in g s to produce U s in (3) and a new hash value E as follows:
E ¼ H ðu s1 ; u s2 ; Á Á Á ; u st Þ Then, each P si in g s replaces (4) with the following equation:
e ¼ H ðU s ; E; mÞ After the computation of (5) and (6), {e, Z s , E} becomes the threshold signature of m. After (16), (17) and (18) have been performed, the threshold signature can be verified by the following equation in place of (8) .
mÞ
If the above equation holds, the threshold signature {e, Z s , E} on the message m is valid. If the original signers agree to make it public that they are the true signers, they can show ðr si ; u si Þ to an arbiter. The arbiter checks the following equations:
If the above equations hold, the arbiter will believe that they are the true signers. Theorem 3. The individual signatures can be verified by the clerk.
Proof. The value u si separately computed in (2) and (18) is
mod N Therefore, the correctness of (13) can be verified. That is, (e, e i , z si ) must be an individual signature on message m.
Q . E . D . Obviously, in our scheme, if P si in G s has computed e i and sent it to the clerk to verify her/his individual signature, the properties of our scheme are the same as those of the schemes in [19, 20] . In other words, the participants in the signing group can determine whether or not to stay anonymous. Furthermore, the SDC can be revoked after the parameters generating phase in our scheme.
Security analysis
The security of our proposed scheme is the same as that of Lee et al.'s scheme, which is based on the difficulty of breaking the RSA scheme [4] . Theorem 1 shows that any subset of t participants in G s can generate the threshold signature and any subset of k participants in G v can verify the group signature. Note that the attackers on the proposed schemes may come from inside (denoted as 'impostors') or outside (denoted as 'adversaries') of the signing/verifying group. In the rest of this Section, some possible attacks are raised and fought against to prove the security of our scheme. 
r si from U s is as difficult as breaking the RSA scheme, and the difficulty of extracting the (a Á c Á e)th root of Z s Á ð Q i2gs r si Þ À1 mod N is equivalent to breaking the RSA scheme when gcd(a Á c Á e, l (N)) ¼ 1 and equivalent to factoring N if gcd(a Á c Á e, pÀ1) ¼ 1 or gcd(a Á c Á e, qÀ1) ¼ 1. Moreover, the parameters (a, c) are secret. Attack 2: An adversary tries to reveal P si 's secret key K si in G s from the known information. Case 1: The equation y si ¼ K si ÀW mod N and P si 's public keys y si , N and the parameter W are known. It is as difficult as breaking the RSA scheme to reveal P si 's secret key K si . Case 2: Equation (1) and the public value x si are known. It is infeasible for the adversary to derive P si 's secret key K si if f s (x si ), a, p 0 and q 0 are unknown. Case 3: Equations (2) and (5) and the individual signature z si are known. The adversary should first find out the random number r si from u si . Then, she/he has to calculate the 
Moreover, if the broadcasting cryptosystems [25, 26] Attack 5: An adversary tries to impersonate P vi in g v . As with attack 4, the adversary should face the difficulty of generating a valid value z 0 vi in (18) . Attack 6: In G s , t or more malicious impostors try to reconstruct the secret polynomial f s (x) of degree t À 1 to obtain other participants' secret keys K si . Since the SDC distributes K si ¼ a si mod N in place of s i , t or more pairs (x si , K si ) cannot help reconstruct f s (x). If the impostor tries to reveal s i from K si , it is as difficult as the problem of solving the discrete logarithm modulo a composite number N if a is known. Furthermore, a and l(N) are secret in our scheme. On the other hand, t or more malicious impostors cannot collude to retrieve l(N). Attack 7: In G v , k or more malicious impostors try to reconstruct the secret polynomial f k (x) of degree kÀ1 to obtain other participants' secret keys K vi . As with attack 6, k or more malicious impostors in G v cannot reconstruct the secret polynomial of degree kÀ1 to obtain other participants' secret keys K vi . Attack 8: An adversary tries to forge the group signature {e, Z s } for the message m.
The adversary randomly computes the productive value U s and the hash value e ¼ H (U s , m) If gcd(e 1 , e 2 ) ¼ 1, the group secret key S and the value a d Á b Á h can be revealed by the Euclidean algorithm. Then, anyone can easily use S and a d Á b Á h to generate and verify other threshold signatures without cooperation, respectively. To separately reveal r si and r vi from u si in (2) and u vi in (14) , it is as difficult as breaking the RSA scheme. Under the same protection, the adversary has to break the RSA scheme to separately reveal Q 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have added the requirement of (k, l) threshold-shared verification to Lee et al.'s scheme by using the extended Euclidean algorithm and demonstrated the ability of our new scheme to work against some possible attacks. Our security analysis has revealed that our scheme can withstand these attacks under factorisation. Moreover, our scheme provides both traceability mode and untraceability mode for the participants to choose from. With untraceability, the original signers also have the ability to prove they are the true signers.
